EQUITABLE EsCHILD SUPPORT TOPPEL MAY BE APPLIED To PREVENT STEPPARENT FROM DENYING OBLIGATION To SUPPORT STEPCHILDREN AFTER
DIVORCING NATURAL PARENT - Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154,

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

-

478 A.2d 351 (1984).
In her dreary kitchen Cinderella had no thought of litigation, nor of the
august courts and legislatures which have toiled sporadically to define
the incidents of her status.*
English and American courts have traditionally been reluctant

to impose a legal obligation upon stepparents' to support their
stepchildren. 2 Instead, courts have consistently held that child support by a stepparent is purely voluntary,3 reflecting the belief that
natural parents bear the ultimate burden of child support.4 As this
area of the law developed, however, exceptions to this hard and fast
rule emerged. One exception adopted by many modern courts 5 involves the creation of an in loco parentis relationship when a stepparent accepts a child into his home.6 In the proper circumstances, 7 this
in loco parentis relationship will impose upon the stepparent a legal
* Note, Stepchildren and In Loco Parentis Relationships, 52 HARV. L. REV. 515, 515
(1939).
i A stepparent is defined as "[t]he mother or father of a child born during a
previous marriage of the other parent and hence, not the natural parent of such
child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (5th ed. 1979). The terms "stepparent" and

"stepfather" are used interchangeably throughout this note because all of the cases
cited deal specifically with stepfathers. Presumably, the same principles of law
would apply to stepmothers.
2 See Schneider v. Schneider, 25 NJ. Misc. 180, 182- 83, 52 A.2d 564, 566 (Ch.
1947).
3 See, e.g., D. v. D., 56 NJ. Super. 357, 361, 153 A.2d 332, 334 (App. Div. 1959);
Schneider v. Schneider, 25 NJ. Misc. 180, 182-83, 52 A.2d 564, 566 (Ch. 1947);
State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 1238, 91 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1958).
4 See generally Lewis & Levy, Family Law and Welfare Policies: The Casefor "Dual
Systems", 54 CALIF. L. REV. 748, 762 (1966) (explaining historical reluctance to
transfer parental support obligations from natural parent to stepparent).
5 See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 665-66, 11 Cal. Rptr.
707, 711 (1961); In re Adoption of Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 1184-85, 59 N.W.2d
685, 687 (1953); Brummitt v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. Ct. App.
1962).
6 See Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 183, 52 A.2d 564, 566 (Ch.
1947). The Schneider court was careful to recognize that this in loco parentis "relationship does not exist unless it is self-imposed." Id.
7 See A.S. v. B.S., 139 N.J. Super. 366, 369, 354 A.2d 100, 101 (Ch. Div. 1976).
The court outlined the factors necessary for an in loco parentis relationship: "The
essential elements of that status [include] the intent to assume the parental relationship, which clearly is a question of fact rather than law. Furthermore, the relationship exists only so long as the parties thereto, namely the surrogate parent
and/or the child, desire that it exist." Id.
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duty to support his stepchildren. 8 The same courts recognize, nevertheless, that the stepparent's duty of support in an in loco parentis
situation will terminate upon divorce.9 Recently, this principle was
substantially modified by the NewJersey Supreme Court. o In Miller
v. Miller," the supreme court held that in appropriate situations the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to continue the stepparent's support obligations after divorce from the natural parent.1 2
Gladys Miller was initially married to Ralph Febre, with whom
she had two children, Michelle and Suzette." s After Gladys and
Ralph separated in 1966,'4 Ralph provided support for Gladys and
the children until he was sent to prison in 1968.5
During Ralph's
16
prison term, Gladys and Ralph were divorced.
17
On December 16, 1972, Gladys was remarried to Jay Miller.
Michelle and Suzette lived with the couple,' 8 and Jay assumed the
obligation to support the children.' 9 Although Ralph also attempted
to provide support for his children, 20 Jay objected vehemently. 2 '
Ralph once endeavored to send money to the girls, but Jay destroyed the check before they received it. 22 Confronted with Jay's
8 See id. at 369-70, 354 A.2d at 101-02.
9 See id. at 370, 354 A.2d at 102 (dissolution of familial unit by divorce deemed
to terminate stepparent's intent to support child).
10 Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 167, 478 A.2d 351, 357-58 (1984).
11 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984).
12 Id. at 167, 478 A.2d at 357-58.
13 Id. at 159, 478 A.2d at 353.
14 Id. At the time of their natural parents' separation, Michelle was approximately two and one-half years old, and Suzette was approximately six months old.
Plaintiff-Respondent's Letter Brief at 1, Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff-Respondent's Letter Brief].
15 Miller, 97 N.J. at 160, 478 A.2d at 353-54. Before he went to prison on a drug
charge, Ralph gave Gladys $5,000 to assist in the support of his children. Id., 478
A.2d at 354. Ralph made no further support payments while he was in prison. See
id., 478 A.2d at 353-54.
16 See id. at 159-60, 478 A.2d at 353-54. The divorce agreement between Gladys
and Ralph contained no provision regarding Ralph's support of the children. Id. at
160, 478 A.2d at 353.
17 Id. at 158, 478 A.2d at 353. Preceding their marriage, Gladys, Jay, and
Gladys's two daughters lived together for one year. Brief and Appendix for Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant at 4, Miller v. Miller, No. A-2968-81T2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. June 16, 1983), rev'd and remanded, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief].
18 Miller, 97 N.J. at 158, 478 A.2d at 353.
19 Id. at 160, 478 A.2d at 354. Jay also claimed the children as dependents on
his tax return for 1979. Id.
20 See id.
21 See id. Jay feared that accepting Ralph's offers of support would associate
Gladys and himself to illegal drug activities. Id.
22 Id. Gladys argued that the check destroying incident evidenced Jay's insis-
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persistent opposition, Ralph ultimately stopped trying to support
his daughters.23
During his marriage to Gladys, Jay established a strong, loving
relationship with his two stepdaughters. 2" Although the girls were
aware that Ralph was their natural father, they introduced Jay as
their father to their friends. 2 5 Jay even undertook to adopt the girls,
but Ralph refused to give his consent. 2 6 Nevertheless, the girls began to use the surname Miller, and their scholastic records were
changed to indicate this.2 7
On December 12, 1979, Gladys and Jay separated, and Jay discontinued his support for the children. 2 1 Shortly thereafter, Gladys
filed a complaint for divorce, seeking monetary support from Jay for
the two girls. 29 Gladys alleged that Jay led the girls to depend on
him as their father to their economic and emotional detriment.3 0
Moreover, she complained that Jay's actions interfered with and terminated the relationship between the girls and Ralph. 3 1 Consequently, she asserted that Jay should be equitably estopped from
renouncing his obligation to provide child support. 3 2 In his answer,
Jay admitted that he temporarily stood in loco parentis to the girls, but
he contended that any legal and financial relationship ended after
tence on being the sole support of her children and on being their only father. See
Plaintiff-Respondent's Letter Brief, supra note 14, at 2.
23 Miller, 97 N.J. at 160, 478 A.2d at 354.
24 Id. It was uncontested that during the marriage Jay stood in locoparentis to the
two girls. See Plaintiff-Respondent's Letter Brief, supra note 14, at 1-2. The
supreme court agreed with the appellate division that Jay "was an affectionate father and took the girls everywhere. He held the girls out as his own children. He
even became a Girl Scout Troop leader, so he could be with them. He enjoyed
sports with them and they came to love UJay] as a father." Miller, 97 N.J. at 160, 478
A.2d at 354 (quoting Miller v. Miller, No. A-2968-81T2, slip op. at 2-3 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.June 16, 1983), rev'd and remanded, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984)).
25 See Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief, supra note 17, at 32.
26 Miller, 97 N.J. at 160, 478 A.2d at 354.
27 Id. at 160-61, 478 A.2d at 354. The parties disputed the question of who
initiated the name change. Id. Gladys testified, however, that Jay would not sign
school documents unless the documents indicated that the girls' surname was
Miller. See Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief, supra note 17, at 23. It should be noted,
however, that both girls returned to using the name Febre once Gladys and Jay
were divorced. Miller, 97 N.J. at 161, 478 A.2d at 354.
28 Miller, 97 N.J. at 158, 478 A.2d at 353.
29 Id. Gladys also prayed for alimony, equitable distribution, and payment of her
counsel fees. Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 1, Miller v. Miller,
No. A-2968-81T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 16, 1983), reid and remanded, 97
N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984).
30 Miller, 97 N.J. at 158-59, 478 A.2d at 353.
31 Id. at 159, 478 A.2d at 353.
32 Id.
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his divorce from Gladys. 3
Focusing on the "emotional bonding" that Jay intentionally developed with his stepchildren,34 the trial court held that Jay was equitably estopped from disclaiming his duty to support the
children.3 5 Most salient to the court was the fact that Jay's actions
not only led the girls to regard Jay as their "real" father, but also
tended to alienate their natural parent, Ralph.3 6 The appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision, but did not rely on the "emotional bonding" theory. 7 Instead, the court found that Jay had
interfered with the girls' relationship with their natural father to
their financial and emotional detriment.38 Jay appealed the decision
to the supreme court, and certification was granted.3 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could indeed be used in certain cases to impose a
child support obligation on stepparents after they have separated
from or divorced the natural parent.4" In Miller, the supreme court
found the facts sufficient to establish a pendente lite obligation, but
reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court determine if a permanent support obligation could similarly be
imposed.4 '
The rights of stepchildren to receive support from their stepparents have evolved slowly through the years.4 2 At common law,
33 Id. See generally infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussion of common law rule that the in loco parentis relationship terminates upon the divorce of the
stepparent and the natural parent).
34 Miller, 97 N.J. at 159, 478 A.2d at 353. The trial court used the term "emotional bonding" to describe the psychological relationship between a child and the
person he perceives as his parent. Miller v. Miller, No. M-13516-79, slip op. at 3
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb. 17, 1982) (citingJ. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (new ed. 1979)), aff'd, No. A-296881T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.June 16, 1983), rev'd and remanded, 97 N.J. 154,478
A.2d 351 (1984).
35 Miller, 97 N.J. at 159, 478 A.2d at 353.
36 Miller v. Miller, No. M-13516-79, slip op. at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb.
17, 1982), aff'd, No. A-2968-81T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 16, 1983), rev'd
and remanded, 97 N.J. 154,478 A.2d 351 (1984). The trial court concluded that Jay
could not escape his financial obligations arising out of the step relationship "by
reason of a biological fact." Id. at 3-4.
37 See Miller, 97 N.J. at 159, 478 A.2d at 353.
38 Id.
39 Miller v. Miller, 94 N.J. 614, 468 A.2d 243 (1983).
40 Miller, 97 N.J. at 159, 170, 478 A.2d at 353, 359.
41 Id.
42 See generally Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship: Cinderella
Revisited, 4 FAM. L.Q. 209, 227 (1970) (although there may be a "modern tendency. . .to assimilate the stepchild to the natural child," courts have been unwilling to hold stepparents liable for the support of their stepchildren).
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the stepfather had no legal obligation to support children born during his spouse's prior marriage.4 3 This rule, still in existence today,
was based on the premise that a stepfather should not be responsible for another man's child.4 4 Despite the common law rule, a few
states, excluding New Jersey,"5 have enacted legislation imposing
upon the stepparent a duty to support his stepchildren.4 6 Absent
such a statute, however, voluntary assumption of the parental relationship was the only way to impose a support obligation on the
stepparent. 4 7 When a person placed himself in the position of a parent and assumed the parental obligations toward the child, that person stood in loco parentis to the child.4" The in loco parentis
relationship arose when a stepparent took his spouse's child into his
home "under circumstances giving rise to a presumption that he or
she [would] assume responsibility to maintain, rear, and educate the
child." 4 9 This relationship traditionally terminated when the stepparent and the natural parent divorced. 50
43 Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 182-83, 52 A.2d 564, 566 (Ch.
1947). At early common law, even the natural parent's duty to support his child
was regarded only as a moral obligation and not a legal one. See generally 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447. Blackstone recognized this duty to be a principle of natural law bestowed upon the parent "not only by nature [but also by the
parent's] own proper act, in bringing [the child] into the world." Id. Blackstone
described giving a child life, and then watching the child "perish," as injurious to
the child "in the highest manner." Id. In contrast, today's statutes mandate the
natural parents' maintenance of their children. See, e.g., 1 G.SKOLOFF & L. CUTLER,
NEW JERSEY FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 5.1B (5th ed. 1984) (list of NewJersey statutory sources that provide child support awards).
44 Lewis & Levy, supra note 4, at 762. It has been observed that the stepfather's
immunity from support responsibility probably "reflects ancient notions of the
sanctity of blood ties and the indissolubility of marriage rather than any contemporary examination of the social values at stake." Id.
45 Miller, 97 N.J. at 162, 478 A.2d at 355.
46 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 577-4 (1976); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 415 (McKinney
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (Cum. Supp. 1985). But see Lewis &
Levy, supra note 4, at 762 (suggesting that legislatures will be hesitant to enact
stepchildren support statutes and depart from the "emotionally appealing" argument--'the natural father brought the children into the world, let him pay for
them").
47 Berkowitz, supra note 42, at 212.
48 See Hails, In Loco Parentis and the Relevant Child, 2 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 712,
714 (1975). The in loco parentis relationship bestows upon the stepparent the same
burdens and benefits of natural parenthood. Id. See generally Mahoney, Support and
Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 41-43
(1984) (discussion of in loco parentis relationship); Bartlett, Rethinking ParenthoodAs
an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family
Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 913-14 (1984) (same).
49. Miller, 97 N.J. at 162, 478 A.2d at 355.
50 See Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 665-66, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707,
711 (1961).
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In 1947, the New Jersey Court of Chancery delineated the pa51
rameters of the in loco parentis relationship in Schneider v. Schneider.
August and Catherine Schneider were married for less than a year.5 2
During that time, Mrs. Schneider's child from a previous marriage
lived with them. 53 After the couple separated,5 4 Mrs. Schneider refused to return to her husband unless he agreed to permit her child
to live with them.5 5 Mr. Schneider then sued Mrs. Schneider for divorce based on desertion.5 6 Mrs. Schneider countered that, because
August was a stepfather, he stood in loco parentis to the child and
therefore had "a legal duty to receive and maintain the child in any
marital home." 5' 7
The Schneider court disagreed with Mrs. Schneider and reiterated the common law rule that a stepfather is under no obligation to
maintain his wife's child from a previous marriage.5 8 The court held
that even if a stepfather voluntarily took a stepchild into his home
and assumed an in loco parentis relationship to the child, the attaching
parental obligations continued only so long as the stepparent intended for them to continue. 59 The Schneider court emphasized the
temporary nature of this relationship as a factor supporting the
stepparent's power to terminate his in loco parentis support duties at
will.6"
51 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (Ch. 1947).

See id. at 180, 52 A.2d at 565.
Id.
54 Id. at 181, 52 A.2d at 565. The parties had separated once before, but had
resumed marital relations. Id. Apparently, there was disagreement as to the upbringing of the child and disharmony in the family home caused by Mr. Schneider's
refusal to adopt the child. See id.
55 Id. at 182, 52 A.2d at 565. Schneider was decided prior to the days of "no
fault" divorce, when divorce grounds were limited. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2
(1952) (divorce grounds limited to adultery, desertion, and extreme cruelty)
(amended 1971). If the married parties separated during this era of divorce law,
and neither party had committed one of the offenses warranting a divorce, either
party had a right to demand resumption of marital relations. See Schneider, 25 N.J.
Misc. at 181, 52 A.2d at 565. If one spouse refused to terminate the separation, he
or she would be deemed a "deserter," supplying the other party with a ground for
divorce. See id.
56 Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. at 180, 52 A.2d at 565. See generally supra note 55 (explaining desertion as a traditional ground for divorce).
57 Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. at 182, 52 A.2d at 566.
58 Id. at 182-83, 52 A.2d at 566.
59 See id. at 183-84, 52 A.2d at 566-67. The Schneider court defined the stepparent in an in loco parentis position as "a person who means to put himself in the
situation of the lawful father of the child, with reference to the father's office and
duty of making provision for the child." Id. at 183, 52 A.2d at 566 (quoting Brinkerhoff v. Merselis' Ex'r, 24 N.J.L. 680, 683 (Sup. Ct. 1855)).
60 See id. at 184-85, 52 A.2d at 567. More specifically, the Schneider court corn52
53
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In 1959, the principles espoused in Schneider were applied in D.
v. D. 6 In that case, the court permitted a stepfather to disclaim his
in loco parentis relationship after fourteen years of providing for the
child.6 2 During the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. D., three children were
born.6 3 Mr. D. was not the father of the second child, however.'
Nonetheless, that child was supported by Mr. D., used his surname,
and was always considered "a part of the family." 6 5 When the parties separated, Mrs. D. sought child support for all three children. 6 6
The appellate division, following Schneider, held that although Mr. D.
"long stood in loco parentis to the [second] child," he could not be
forced to support a child that was not his own.6 7 In reaching its decision, the court, as in Schneider, focused upon the temporary character of the in loco parentis relationship6 8 and the fact that the
stepparent did not intend for this relationship to continue after
divorce.6 9
One year after D. v. D., a New Jersey court departed from the
general rule that a stepparent's in loco parentis relationship automatically terminated with his divorce from the natural parent.7y In
Amadeo v. Amadeo, 7 ' three children lived with Lorayne and Paul
Amadeo during their marriage; two children were their own and one
child was Mrs. Amadeo's by a prior marriage. 2 When Mr. and Mrs.
pared the temporary support obligations of an in loco parentis relationship with the
permanent support obligations of adoption:
Assuming that the [in loco parentis] relationship once existed in this case,
it has not continued to exist and it may not again exist without the husband meaning that it shall exist. "Loco parentis has to do with custody,
liability to support, and the like, and is temporary in character, and is
not to be likened to that of adoption. The one is temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding."
Id. (citation omitted).
61 56 N.J. Super. 357, 153 A.2d 332 (App. Div. 1959).
62 See id. at 359, 361-62, 153 A.2d at 333, 334.
63 Id. at 359, 153 A.2d at 333.
64 Id. Mr. D. was fully aware of the parentage of the second child, but still chose
to resume marital relations with his wife. Id.
65

Id.

66 Id., 153 A.2d at 332.
67 Id. at 361-62, 153 A.2d at 334. Although the court permitted Mr. D. to disclaim a support obligation, no evidence was produced at the trial to prove that Mr.
D. terminated his in loco parentis relationship with the second child. See id. at 359,
153 A.2d at 333.
68 Id. at 361-62, 153 A.2d at 334; see also supra note 60.
69 See D. v. D., 56 N.J. Super. at 361, 153 A.2d at 334; see also supra note 59.
70 See Amadeo v. Amadeo, 64 N.J. Super. 417, 425-26, 166 A.2d 397, 401 (App.
Div. 1960).
71 64 N.J. Super. 417, 166 A.2d 397 (App. Div. 1960).
72 Id. at 420, 166 A.2d at 398.
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Amadeo separated, the husband voluntarily continued to support all
three children. 73 After one year, Mr. Amadeo reduced the amount
of these payments, causing Mrs. Amadeo to sue for continued support."4 Although she sued only for the maintenance of the two children born of the marriage, 75 the trial court awarded Mrs. Amadeo
essentially the same amount of support that the husband had been
voluntarily contributing to her and the three children. 7 6 In appealing the support order, Mr. Amadeo relied on D. v. D. and argued
that he was not required to provide support for his stepchild.7 7 The
appellate division rejected his argument and held that Mr. Amadeo
was responsible for supporting the stepchild because he remained in
loco parentis to the child after separating from Mrs. Amadeo. 78 Furthermore, the court stated that Mr. Amadeo would continue to remain in loco parentis to his stepchild until he affirmatively disclaimed
the relationship.7 9
In 1973, a county trial court became the first court in New
Jersey to rely upon the theory of equitable estoppel8 ° in order to
73 See id. Mr. Amadeo also took care of all the large household expenses, such as
the mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, and utility charges. Id.
74 See id. at 419-20, 166 A.2d at 398.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 420-21, 166 A.2d at 399. The court also awarded Mrs. Amadeo custody of all three children and continued occupancy in the marital home owned by
Mr. Amadeo. Id. at 421, 166 A.2d at 399. Mr. Amadeo was awarded weekly visitation rights and was ordered to continue paying the large household expenses on
the marital home. Id.
77 Id. at 425, 166 A.2d at 401.
78 See id. The facts that Mr. Amadeo never excluded the stepchild from visitation
negotiations and that he claimed the stepchild as an income tax deduction convinced the court that Mr. Amadeo intended to stand in loco parentis to his stepchild.
Id. The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court, however, to determine the financial status of the parties. See id. at 424, 166 A.2d at 401.
79 Id. at 425, 166 A.2d at 401.
80 Equitable estoppel prevents a party's disavowal of "acts done or positions
taken or assumed by him when there has been reliance thereon and prejudice
would result to the other party." Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J. Super. 394, 398, 314 A.2d
623, 625 (Essex County Ct. 1973) (quoting Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 115 N.J.
Super. 189, 197, 278 A.2d 531, 535 (Ch. Div. 1971)), aff'd, 135 N.J. Super. 35, 342
A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1975).
The essential elements of equitable estoppel are as follows: (1) first party conduct that amounts to a false representation; (2) knowledge by the first party that his
representation was untrue; (3) expectation or intention by the first party that his
conduct will be acted upon; (4) ignorance of the truth by the second party asserting
equitable estoppel; (5) reliance by the second party upon the first party's conduct;
and (6) change of position for the worse by the second party. See Clark v. Judge, 84
N.J. Super. 35, 54, 200 A.2d 801, 812 (Ch. Div. 1964), aff'd, 44 NJ. 550, 210 A.2d
415 (1965); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 463, 474-75, 175
A.2d 683, 688-89 (Ch. Div. 1961); Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 593, 72 A.2d
414, 419 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 6 N.J. 1, 76 A.2d 885 (1950).
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impose a continuing support obligation on a stepparent. 8' In Ross v.
Ross, 82 David Ross married Beverly Ross eighteen months after the
birth of her illegitimate child.8 3 During the marriage, the husband
claimed natural parentage by filing a certificate admitting paternity
with the New Jersey Bureau of Vital Statistics.8 4 The child grew up
believing that David Ross was his father. 85 Nevertheless, when the
parties separated and Beverly Ross sought child support, the stepfather denied that he was the natural father and argued that he could
not be forced to support a child that was not his own.8 6 Although
Mrs. Ross also admitted that her husband was not the child's natural
81 See Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J. Super. 394, 314 A.2d 623 (Essex County Ct. 1973),
aff'd, 135 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1975).
82 126 N.J. Super. 394, 314 A.2d 623 (Essex County Ct. 1973), aff'd, 135 N.J.
Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1975).
83 Id. at 395, 314 A.2d at 624.
84 Id. at 396, 314 A.2d at 624. A New Jersey statute provides that proof of the
subsequent marriage of an illegitimate child's natural parents coupled with a request by both natural parents enables the State registrar to amend the child's birth
certificate to reflect the father's surname. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40 (West Cum.
Supp. 1984-1985).
85 See Ross, 126 N.J. Super. at 396-97, 314 A.2d at 624-25.
86 Id. at 397, 314 A.2d at 625. The stepfather argued that even if he previously
admitted paternity under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40, he should not be estopped to
later deny his parenthood. See Ross, 126 N.J. Super. at 397, 314 A.2d at 625. In
support of this argument, the stepfather relied on Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 106 N.J. Super. 61, 254 A.2d 141 (Law Div. 1969). Ross, 126 N.J. Super. at
397, 314 A.2d at 625. In Jackson, a child was conceived and born during the marriage of his mother and stepparent, but it was clear that the stepparent was not the
father because he had no access to his wife at the time she became pregnant. See
Jackson, 106 N.J. Super. at 75-76, 254 A.2d at 149. The stepparent was killed, and
the subsequent litigation addressed the issue of who was entitled to insurance proceeds. Id. at 64-65, 254 A.2d at 142-43. The stepchild contended that he was the
decedent's son and was therefore legally entitled to the proceeds as the decedent's
next of kin. Id. at 75, 254 A.2d at 148. The court held that the child was not
entitled to the insurance proceeds and would not even entertain the argument that
"acquiescence to parenthood by married adults bars and estops a later denial of
parenthood." Id. at 77-78, 254 A.2d at 150. The Ross court found, however, that
the Jackson decision was "totally devoid of precedential value" because the equitable estoppel issue was left open. Ross, 126 N.J. Super. at 399-400, 314 A.2d at 626.
The Ross court therefore held the stepparent responsible for child support. Id. at
400, 314 A.2d at 626.
The Ross court found more persuasive the decision in Bartholdi v. Dumbeky,
37 N.J. Super. 418, 117 A.2d 518 (App. Div. 1955). See Ross, 126 N.J. Super. at
399-400, 314 A.2d at 626. Bartholdi concerned the application of New Jersey's intestate laws to illegitimate children. See Bartholdi, 37 N.J. Super. at 424, 117 A.2d at
521. In Bartholdi, the decedent's husband challenged the maternity of the decedent's illegitimate child. Id. at 422, 117 A.2d at 520. Because the decedent's husband had previously entered into settlement agreements with the child conceding
the child's maternity and illegitimacy, the court barred the husband from subsequently disputing the child's status. Id. at 424, 117 A.2d at 521.
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father,8 7 the court found that both David and Beverly Ross were estopped from denying Mr. Ross's paternity.8 8 The court opined that
equitable estoppel was an appropriate remedy because David Ross
represented himself as the child's natural father, and the child sincerely believed that David Ross was his father.8 9 The court reasoned
that the child was the "real party in interest," and if parentage was
denied, the child would be "irretrievably injured."90
Less than three years after the Ross decision, another New
Jersey court used the equitable estoppel doctrine to prevent a stepparent from disclaiming his child support obligations. 9 ' In A.S. v.
B.S.,92 the natural parents gave their child to Mr. and Mrs. S. approximately one month after his birth.9 3 Mr. and Mrs. S. raised the
child as part of their own family for almost nine years, and the child
had absolutely no contact with his natural parents.9 4 After Mr. and
Mrs. S. were divorced, the chancery division ordered Mr. S. to pay
child support.9 5 Mr. S. subsequently filed for relief from that order.9 6 Relying on D. v. D. and Amadeo, he argued that his support
obligation terminated because he no longer intended for the in loco
97
parentis relationship to exist.

Ross, 126 N.J. Super. at 396, 314 A.2d at 624.
Id. at 400, 314 A.2d at 626.
Id.
90 Id. The court stated:
Bastardizing the child. . .may permanently wound him emotionally. . . .Every child has the need to feel rooted. . . .When such knowledge is denied the child may resort to fantasy to fill the void. As the
links to his past disappear with time, the search for his identity will become more difficult. The anxiety to learn what was in his past may be
pathological, making it more difficult for the child to lead a useful life
and to form meaningful relationships.
Id. (quoting In re Adoption by K., 92 N.J. Super. 204, 208, 222 A.2d 552, 554
(Bergen County Ct. 1966)).
91 See A.S. v. B.S., 139 N.J. Super. 366, 372, 354 A.2d 100, 103 (Ch. Div. 1976),
aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 122, 374 A.2d 1259 (App. Div. 1977).
92 139 N.J. Super. 366, 354 A.2d 100 (Ch. Div. 1976), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 122,
374 A.2d 1259 (App. Div. 1977).
93 Id. at 368, 354 A.2d at 101. The natural parents delivered to Mr. and Mrs. S.
a document entitled "Power of Attorney-Consent to Guardian and Consent to
Custody," which gave them "exclusive guardianship" over the child. Id. Mr. and
Mrs. S. stipulated that they read this "Power of Attorney." Id. at 369, 354 A.2d at
101. The court found that this "Power of Attorney" was sufficient to demonstrate
that the natural parents intended Mr. and Mrs. S. to raise their child and that Mr.
and Mrs. S. accepted that responsibility. Id. at 372, 354 A.2d at 103.
94 See id. at 369, 354 A.2d at 101. The child used the surname of Mr. and Mrs.
S., and they were his only source of support. Id.
95 Id. at 368-69, 354 A.2d at 101.
96 Id. at 369, 354 A.2d at 101.
97 See id. at 370, 354 A.2d at 102.
87
88
89
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The A.S. v. B.S. court recognized that prior case law supported
the contention that absent intent, an in loco parentis relationship
ceased to exist. 9 8 The court determined, however, that it was necessary to consider the doctrine of equitable estoppel before it could
terminate the support order. 99 Unlike the typical "stepfather" case,
neither A.S. nor B.S. was the child's natural parent.' 0 0 The natural
parents had abandoned him completely. 10 ' The child was held out
to the world as the son of Mr. and Mrs. S.' 0 2 Influenced by the holding in Ross, the A.S. v. B.S. court estopped Mr. S. from escaping his
support duties.' 0 3 The court emphasized that the child relied on Mr.
and Mrs. S. to provide for him, and he would suffer "irreparable
harm" if Mr. S. were permitted to repudiate the duties of a natural
father.10 4 The court reasoned that equitable estoppel was an appro10 5
priate remedy to prevent the elimination of the child's heritage.
It was against this background of development and change in
New Jersey's stepchild support laws that the Miller litigation arose.
In Miller, the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed the rationales of
the Ross' 6 and A.S. v. B.S. 107 decisions in a factual situation similar
98 Id.
99 Id. at 371, 354 A.2d at 102.
100 See id. at 370-71, 354 A.2d at 102.
101 See id. at 368, 354 A.2d at 101.

Id. at 371, 354 A.2d at 102.
See id. at 371-72, 354 A.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 371, 354 A.2d at 102-03.
See id. at 371-72, 354 A.2d at 102-03.
See Miller, 97 N.J. at 163-65, 478 A.2d at 355-57. Justice Garibaldi noted that
in cases like Ross, the typical circumstances involved a man who "marries a woman
who is either pregnant by another man or has recently given birth to another man's
child." Id. at 165, 478 A.2d at 357. Thereafter, the husband assumes the role of
natural parent and represents himself as such to the child and to the public. Id.
Justice Garibaldi stated that equitable estoppel was an appropriate remedy in these
situations because it is highly immoral to permit a "parent" to bastardize a child,
long after the parent has treated the child as his own, merely to avoid paying child
support. Id. (citing Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 664, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 707, 710 (1961)). In NewJersey, when a man marries a woman who is pregnant there is a rebuttable presumption that the child is the legitimate offspring of
the parties. See In re Adoption by K., 92 N.J. Super. 204, 206, 222 A.2d 552, 553
(Bergen County Ct. 1966); cf. Hall v. Rosen, 50 Ohio St. 2d 135, 136-37, 363 N.E.
2d 725, 726 (1977) (the legitimacy presumption is conclusive in Ohio).
107 Miller, 97 N.J. at 164-66, 478 A.2d at 356-57. The court reasoned that where
neither natural parent is available to care for the child, the use of equitable estoppel
is fitting because the child has relied on the stepparent's support to the exclusion of
other potential providers. Id. at 166, 478 A.2d at 357; see also In re Marriage of
Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1975) (stepparent estopped to deny
paternity and duty to pay child support of children he brought from Mexico to the
United States and treated as his own); Wener v. Wener, 35 A.D. 2d 50, 312 N.Y.S.
2d 815 (1970) (stepparent who brought child into his home with the intention of
adopting the child estopped to deny child support obligation).
102
103
104
105
106
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to those cases.' 08 Moreover, the court extended the equitable estoppel theory to permit the imposition of a support duty upon a stepparent even though both natural parents are potentially available to
provide child support and the stepchildren do not believe the stepparent is their actual parent.' 0 9
Writing for the Miller majority, 11 Justice Garibaldi set forth
108 See Miller, 97 NJ. at 163-64, 478 A.2d at 356. Instrumental to the Miller
court's acceptance of A.S. v. B.S. and Ross was the reasoning first espoused in the
landmark case of Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707

(1961). The Clevenger court emphasized the strong public policy against allowing
parents to illegitimatize children they have previously treated as their own:
There is an innate immorality in the conduct of an adult who for over a
decade accepts and proclaims a child as his own, but then, in order to be
relieved of the child's support, announces, and relies upon his bastardy.
This is a cruel weapon, which works a lasting injury to the child and can
bring in its aftermath social harm. The weapon should garner no profit
to the wielder; the putative father should earn no premium by the assertion of the illegitimacy of the child. If any legal hypothesis can prevent
such an inducement to publication of illegitimacy, we should adopt that
theory.
Id. at 664, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
Clevenger was the first case in this country to adapt equitable estoppel principles
to a stepchild support action. See id. at 672, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 715. In Clevenger, the
stepchild was born and conceived during the marriage of the husband and wife, but
the husband was not the natural father. Id. at 663, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 709. The
stepchild used the husband's surname, however, and was accepted into the family
and treated as a legitimate child by the husband. Id. at 664, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
The trial court, in response to the wife's complaint for divorce, ordered the husband to pay child support. Id. at 664, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 710. The appellate court
reversed due to insufficient evidence. See id. at 676, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18. Nonetheless, it laid the foundation for recovery based upon the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. See id. The Clevenger court found that the following elements were re-

quired for the application of equitable estoppel: a representation by the husband to
the child that he was the child's natural father; the husband's intention that the
child accept and act upon the representation; reliance by the child upon the representation; and ignorance by the child of the fact that the husband was not the natural father. Id. at 671, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714. These factors, the court opined, benefit
the husband by bestowing upon him the child's love and affection, a right to the
earnings of the child, and the "prestige and fulfillment" that is derived from "the
community's recognition of the husband as a father." Id. Conversely, these factors
cause the child to suffer a detriment because the child is deprived of the natural
father's support, is induced to rely on the stepparent for maintenance and emotional support, and is inflicted with "emotional trauma" as a result of publication of
his illegitimacy. Id. In order to reduce the chances of stepchildren suffering these
injuries, the Clevenger court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to cases
where the husband represents to the child that he is his natural father and the child
believes the husband is the natural father. Id. at 674, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
109 See Miller, 97 N.J. at 167-68, 478 A.2d at 358.
110 Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Schreiber, Pollock, and O'Hern joined in
Justice Garibaldi's opinion. Id. at 178, 478 A.2d at 363. Justice Handler wrote a
separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in whichJustice Clifford
joined. Id.
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guidelines for imposing both temporary and permanent support obligations on stepparents."' The court refused to require the custodial parent to prove the difficult elements of equitable estoppel in
order to obtain a temporary support award."1 2 The majority reasoned that stepchildren who had been primarily supported by the
stepparent clearly needed support for the time between the parents'
separation and a final adjudication of the support issue.' 1 3 The
court therefore held that the custodial parent should be awarded
pendente lite child support' 1 4 if "the natural parent demonstrates that
he or she is not receiving support for the children from their other
natural parent and establishes by affidavit that the stepparent's conduct actively interfered with the children's support by their natural
parent."' 15
The Miller court next defined a more stringent test for imposing
a permanent support obligation on a stepparent." 16 The court
'I
Id. at 167, 478 A.2d at 357-58. Although not pleaded in Miller, Justice Garibaldi acknowledged implied or express contract as an alternate equitable theory for
imposing a permanent support obligation on a stepparent. Id. at 166-67, 478 A.2d
at 357. The implied or express contract theory precludes a stepparent from renouncing his stepchild support obligations if an express or implied child support
contract with the natural parent serves as part of the marital consideration. Id. at
166, 478 A.2d at 357. The typical fact pattern involves a husband who is aware of
his wife's pregnancy by another man when he marries her. See L. v. L., 497 S.W.2d
840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); T. v. T., 216 Va. 867, 224 S.E.2d 148 (1976). Generally,
the rule is that the husband will "not assume a continuing and irrevocable obligation to support" his wife's illegitimate child. L. v. L., 497 S.W. 2d at 841. If the
husband voluntarily assumes a parental position to the child, he will, of course,
stand in loco parentis. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Upon the divorce of his wife, however, the husband's in loco parentis relationship will terminate
along with any support obligations. L. v. L., 497 S.W. 2d at 841. On the other
hand, if the circumstances demonstrate that the husband promised before the marriage to "recognize the child and treat it as his own," some courts will find a binding and valid contract. See, e.g., L. v. L., 497 S.W. 2d at 842; T. v. T., 216 Va. at 871,
224 S.E.2d at 151. The requisite consideration is the wife's agreement to marry the
husband in return for the husband's promise to maintain the child. L. v. L., 497
S.W. 2d at 842. The resulting "contract" is then declared valid and binds the husband to support the child permanently. See L. v. L., 497 S.W. 2d at 842; T. v. T,
216 Va. at 873, 224 S.E. 2d at 152.
112 See Miller, 97 N.J. at 167, 478 A.2d at 358.
113 Id.
I14 The statutory source that allows pendente lite support to be awarded is N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985). It provides in part: "Pending any matrimonial action brought in this State. . .the court may make such order. . .as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children. . .as the
circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable
and just .... " Id. See generally 1 G. SKOLOFF & L. CUTLER, NEW JERSEY FAMILY LAW
PRACTICE § 5.5A (5th ed. 1984) (general discussion of pendente lite awards for
spouses and children).
115 Miller, 97 N.J. at 167, 478 A.2d at 358.
116 See id. at 167-69, 478 A.2d at 358-59.
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placed upon the custodial parent the burden of proving representation, reliance, and detriment-the elements of equitable estoppelas a prerequisite to an order for permanent support. 1 7 In order to
meet the first element, the parent seeking support must demonstrate that the stepparent made a representation of support to either
the custodial parent or the children." The court found it unnecessary for the stepparent to make a representation to the children that
he is their natural parent." 9 In so doing, the Miller court departed
from the decisions of other courts requiring that the children be' 20
lieve "the stepparent is their natural parent."'
The supreme court then addressed the second element of equitable estoppel by focusing on the types of reliance that are insufficient to invoke the remedy. 12 ' The Miller court found that emotional
reliance alone-for example, the "emotional bonding" theory enunciated by the trial court 122-was inadequate. 23 The majority reasoned that to decide differently would create public policy problems
by both punishing stepparents who developed loving family relationships and rewarding stepparents who ignored their
stepchildren. 124
The court determined that the third element, detriment, would
be satisfied only if "representation [s] or conduct" by the stepparent
led to a termination of support by the natural parent. 2 5 If such a
situation was shown to carry future financial detriment for the
117 Id. at 167, 478 A.2d at 358. See also supra note 80 (discussion of elements of
equitable estoppel).
118 Miller, 97 N.J. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358.
119 Id.

120 Id. at 167, 478 A.2d at 358. But see, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.
App. 2d 658, 674, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 716 (1961) (restricting applicability of equitable estoppel to cases in which the children believe that the stepfather is their natural father).
121 Miller, 97 N.J. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358.
122 See generally notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
123 Miller, 97 N.J. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358. The Miller majority declined to set
precedent and be the first court to use equitable estoppel "to force a husband to
support the children of his divorced spouse merely because he developed a close
relationship with the children." Id. Justice Handler, however, argued that "emotional bonding" is a factor to consider when determining a stepparent's support
obligations. Id. at 175, 478 A.2d at 362 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124 Id. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358.
125 Id. at 168-69, 478 A.2d at 358. In contrast, Justice Handler noted an additional detriment to the stepchildren-locating an "unavailable or uncooperative or
unamenable to legal process" natural parent in order to enforce his support duty.
Id. at 177, 478 A.2d at 363 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Handler reasoned that the natural parent's absence was "assuredly a probable consequence" resulting from the stepparent's hostile conduct. Id. Thus, Jus-
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stepchild, the stepparent might be responsible for support payments under the equitable estoppel doctrine. 2 6 Rather than design
an economic detriment test, however, the court, recognizing the
uniqueness of familial
relationships, left the issue to the discretion
27
of the trial courts.

To illustrate the flexibility of the equitable estoppel doctrine,
the supreme court presented two distinct examples of its usage
predicated on the availability of the natural parent. 128 The court
maintained that if the natural parent is unavailable, the custodial
parent has only to demonstrate that this unavailability is a direct result of the stepparent's conduct.' 2 9 The trial court could then equitably estop the stepparent from disclaiming his support
obligation. 30 If the natural parent's whereabouts are known, however, the Miller court held that the custodial parent has the burden
of producing the natural parent in court and first seeking child support from him.' 3 1 The burden then shifts to the natural parent to
prove why he should not have to support his children. 1 32 The court
stated that the natural parent's burden would be met if he could
demonstrate that he relied on the stepparent's exclusive support of
the children and that he is currently unable to support the children. 133 Only then would the Miller court permit an order for child
support to be issued against the stepparent.' 3 4 The Miller court
opined, however, that even if the stepparent is ordered to support
the children, this obligation is subject to modification pending any
1 35
change in the natural parent's ability to provide support.
The New Jersey Supreme Court stressed that in stepchild support cases the equitable estoppel doctrine should be used cautiously. 136 Because "society and its current laws" expect the natural
tice Handler believed that the burden of proof should be on the stepparent to
demonstrate otherwise. Id.
126 Id. at 168-69, 478 A.2d at 358.
127 See id., 478 A.2d at 358-59.
128 Id. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359.
129 Id. In order for the natural parent to be deemed "absent" for purposes of
invoking the test, the custodial parent must show that he "(1) does not know the
whereabouts of the natural parent; (2) cannot locate the other natural parent; or (3)
cannot secure jurisdiction over the natural parent for valid legal reasons." Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132

Id.

133 Id.
134 Id.

135 Id. The Miller court reasoned that "changed circumstances should be reflected
in changed obligations regardless of earlier commitments." Id.
136 Id. at 167, 170, 478 A.2d at 357-58, 359.
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parent to support his own child, the court observed that the natural
parent should always be looked to first for child support.' 7 The majority emphasized that a stepparent could not be forced to support
stepchildren permanently unless he actively interferes with the natural
parent's duty to support. 38 In Miller, the supreme court determined
that Gladys Miller had satisfied its pendente lite test and was entitled
to temporary child support from Jay Miller.'3 9 The supreme court
found, however, that the Miller facts were inadequate to meet the
equitable estoppel test it promulgated for a permanent support
award.' 4 The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision
and remanded the case to the trial court to decide whether the
Miller stepchildren incurred a future financial detriment because of
their economic reliance on Jay Miller.'4 Furthermore, the supreme
court held that the trial court, in order to make a finding that the
Miller stepchildren did indeed suffer such a detriment, must determine that Jay Miller's actions interfered with the natural parent's
duty to support.

14 2

Justice Handler, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed
137 Id. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359.

Id. at 170, 478 A.2d at 359. Justice Garibaldi recognized that collection of
child support from divorced "spouses is a persistent problem throughout this
country." Id. (citation omitted). She accentuated, however, that if the natural parent
fails to support his children due to no fault of the stepparent, the stepparent will
not automatically be obligated to provide permanent support for his stepchildren.
Id. Moreover, Justice Garibaldi suggested that the stepparent, if he has contributed
any temporary or permanent support, may be able to maintain a suit against the
natural parent for reimbursement. Id. But see Note, The Stepfather's Liability for and
Right of Reimbursement Against the Natural Fatherfor Necessaries Furnished the Child, 22
BAYLOR L. REV. 580, 587 (1970) (stepparent's reimbursement for necessaries furnished to stepchild is a difficult achievement).
139 Miller, 97 N.J. at 170, 478 A.2d at 359.
140 Id. Justice Handler disagreed with the majority, however, because he believed
the established facts already warranted an imposition of the equitable estoppel doctrine. Id. at 173, 478 A.2d at 361 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Handler found salient the facts that the Miller stepchildren considered the stepparent to be their father, called the stepparent "daddy," and used the
stepparent's surname. Id. at 175, 478 A.2d at 362 (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Handler argued that these factors evidenced that
the stepparent "succeeded in driving a deep wedge between his stepchildren and
their natural father." Id. Further, Justice Handler focused on the stepparent's
"pronounced and purposeful course of conduct," which resulted in the stepchildren's reliance on their stepfather "as their sole source of paternal sustenance and
support." Id. at 173, 478 A.2d at 361 (Handler,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
141 See id. at 170, 478 A.2d at 359.
142 Id. The Miller court also reversed the appellate court's award of the marital
home to Gladys and remanded the issue to the trial court for a review of the "financial arrangements between the parties." Id. at 171, 478 A.2d at 359-60.
138
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with the majority that equitable estoppel may be an appropriate
remedy to determine the financial interests of stepparents in a matrimonial dispute.' 4 3 Justice Handler urged, however, that the equitable estoppel theory be broadened in this context because a
stepchild's best interests are served by the doctrine.' 4 4 He believed
that temporary and permanent support actions should be treated
uniformly.' 4 5 The simple prerequisite for establishing an equitable
estoppel, Justice Handler argued, should be a support representation by the stepparent that results in the children's detrimental reliance on that stepparent to the exclusion of support from the natural
parent. 14 6 Justice Handler reasoned that the "critical focus" is
whether the stepparent "affirmatively encourage[s], and actually
succeed[s] in attaining, the family's financial dependence upon him
and, further, whether [the stepparent] deliberately and aggressively
cut[s] off the support that the children had been receiving or might
have received from their natural father." 14 7 Departing from the majority's holding, he believed that the Miller facts clearly supported a
finding of permanent support based upon the equitable estoppel
48
theory. 1
Justice Handler also examined the public policy consequences
49
of imposing continuing child support obligations on stepparents. 1
He argued that loving relationships in "step" families would not be
discouraged if equitable estoppel was limited to situations in which
the stepparent "aggressively" alienates his stepchildren from their
natural parent and "vigorously" discourages the natural parent
from supporting his children. 5 ° Justice Handler believed that applying equitable estoppel under those circumstances would deter
stepparents from alienating their stepchildren from the natural
143 Id. at 171, 478 A.2d at 360 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
144 See id. at 172, 478 A.2d at 360 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
145 Id. at 176, 478 A.2d at 363 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 174, 478 A.2d at 361-62 (Handler,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
148 Id. at 173, 478 A.2d at 361 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
149 See id. at 175-76, 478 A.2d at 362 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150 Id. at 176, 478 A.2d at 362 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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parent. '5

Justice Handler concluded his opinion by stating that although
a stepparent may be held responsible for the children's support, the
natural parent's duty does not dissipate. 5 2 In addition, Justice Handler urged that both litigants be given the opportunity to enforce
the natural parent's duty to support.' 5 3 He admonished, however,
that if the natural parent cannot be located, the stepparent
should
' 54
be equitably estopped "from passing the buck-literally."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court, through its decision in Miller,
has taken an important step forward in defining the rights of
stepchildren. In an area of law where trial courts historically have
been slow to act,' 5 5 the Miller court commendably recognized that
stepchildren have needs that deserve the full protection of the
law. 1 56 Under traditional common law principles, a stepparent
might actively alienate a stepchild from its natural father and then
successfully disclaim his duty to support the stepchild upon later divorce from the child's mother. 57 This is no longer the case in New
Jersey. It is now clear that a stepparent cannot cause the termination
of support by the natural parent and then cut off his own support for
the child.' 58 With its ruling in Miller, the state supreme court properly recognized that the best interest of the stepchild must always be
59
served.1
The Miller court noted the different purposes behind temporary
and permanent child support, and the majority proposed different
151

part).

Id., 478 A.2d at 362-63 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

152 Id. at 177-78, 478 A.2d at 363 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
153 Id. at 178, 478 A.2d at 363 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
154 Id.
155 See generally Mahoney, supra note 48, at 40 (noting failure of legislatures and
courts to protect adequately the rights of stepchildren).
156 See Miller, 97 N.J. at 159, 478 A.2d at 353 (concluding that "in appropriate
cases apendente lite and permanent support obligation may be imposed on a stepparent on the basis of equitable estoppel").
157 See Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. at 182-83, 52 A.2d at 566. Common law dictated
that any support which the stepparent afforded his stepchild was provided wholly at
the will of the stepparent. Id. at 183, 52 A.2d at 566. The Schneider court stated that
"[a] stepfather, as such, is under no obligation by the English common law, to
maintain a child of his wife by a former marriage .... Other state decisions on the
subject. . .show that the American common law is to the same effect." Id. at 18283, 52 A.2d at 566 (citations omitted).
158 See Miller, 97 N.J. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359.
159 The "best interest of the child" is the typical standard adopted by courts for
custody and support issues with respect to naturalchildren. See Hails, supra note 48,
at 715.

1986]

NOTES

145

tests for each as they relate to a stepparent's support duties. 160 In
formulating a test for an award of temporary support, the court
opined that a stepchild should not have to face "immediate hardship" because his stepparent divorces his natural parent.' 6 The
court wisely realized that a stepchild who has been dependent on a
stepparent for maintenance must be afforded a simple test to prove
the need for pendente lite support.16 2 The court therefore refused to
require the custodial parent to prove the difficult elements of equitable estoppel in order to receive temporary support. 16 3 Instead, the
court permitted the custodial parent to prove the need for pendente
lite support based solely on sworn testimony. 1 64 A sufficient showing
for an award of temporary support would include the custodial parent's affidavit stating that the natural father is not supporting the
child and that the stepparent actively interfered with the natural father's efforts to support his child.' 16 By easing the custodial parent's
ability to obtain a pendente lite award, the Miller decision preserves
the stepchild's source of support during the uncertain litigation period and properly serves the best interest of the stepchild.
The permanent support tests set down by the Miller court present various problems. For example, the Miller majority would treat
the post-divorce support duties of a stepparent differently depending upon the custodial parent's knowledge of the natural parent's
whereabouts. 166 If the natural father can be located, the Miller decision requires the mother to seek child support from him before proceeding against the stepfather.' 6 7 If the natural parent cannot be
located, however, the decision allows the mother to seek child support from the stepfather immediately.' 6 8 This distinction created by
the Miller majority unfairly penalizes the custodial parent who knows
the location of the child's natural father, 1 69 while it provides the
stepparent with an additional avenue for escaping support liability.
The Miller court might have eliminated this unjust result by allowing
See Miller, 97 N.J. at 167-69, 478 A.2d at 357-59.
Id. at 167, 478 A.2d at 358.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 177, 478 A.2d at 363 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Handler stated that "[i]f, at the time of the demise of the second
marriage, the natural father is hard to find, or unavailable or uncooperative or
unamenable to legal process-if he has to be run down and sued to enforce his
legal obligation-this burden constitutes a sufficient detriment." Id.
160
161
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the custodial parent to proceed concurrently in a support action
70
against the natural father and the stepfather.
Another problem with the Miller decision involves the proofs
required once the custodial parent has succeeded in bringing the
natural father before the court. In this situation, the Miller majority
would compel the natural parent to demonstrate why he should not
have to support his children. 1 7 ' The Miller decision placed this burden on the natural father even in situations where the stepfather has
72
affirmatively acted to alienate the natural father from his children.
The majority therefore allows the stepfather to benefit from what is
otherwise self-serving and undesirable conduct. 71 It is unlikely that
the Miller court intended to reward a stepfather for consciously interfering with a natural father's relationship with his children. Justice Handler suggested a fairer and more desirable way of dealing
with this problem. He would impose upon the stepparent the burden of proving why the natural parent should support his children. 1 74 This approach would ensure that a stepparent will not
escape post-divorce support liability when he has actively estranged
his stepchildren from their natural father.
A major shortcoming of the Miller decision is that many of the
majority's guidelines regarding the support duties of stepparents
are unclear.17 5 Justice Garibaldi's opinion does not precisely state
170 Justice Handler noted that both the custodial parent and the stepparent
"should be required, or given the opportunity, to assert [the support] obligation
against the natural father." Id. at 178, 478 A.2d at 363 (Handler, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
171 Id. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359.
172 See id. The majority emphasized that "the natural parent should always be
considered the primary recourse for child support." Id.
173 See id. at 176-78, 478 A.2d at 362-63 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Handler argued that it is "socially-desirable" to dissuade
stepparents from interfering in their stepchildren's relationships with their natural
parents. Id. at 176, 478 A.2d at 362 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
174 Id. at 176-77, 478 A.2d at 363 (Handler,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
175 A recent decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court exemplifies the confusion
generated by Miller. See M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 100 N.J. 567, 498 A.2d 775 (1985) (per
curiam). In M.H.B., an equally divided supreme court affirmed an appellate division decision that equitably estopped a stepparent from refusing to support his
stepchild. Id. at 568, 498 A.2d at 775. The members of the court disagreed in their
interpretations of Miller. Compare id. at 572-73, 498 A.2d at 777-78 (Handler, J.,
concurring) with id. at 582-83, 498 A.2d at 783-84 (Pollock, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Handler's opinion focused on the reliance element
of equitable estoppel, particularly emotional reliance. See id. at 573-77, 498 A.2d at
778-80 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Pollock, however, in a separate opinion,
stressed the stepparent's interference with the natural parent's support duty and
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whether the support obligations of stepparents are commensurate
76
with or subordinate to the support obligations of natural parents.
The Miller decision suggests that a stepfather's support duties are
secondary to those of the natural father, even when a stepfather is
equitably estopped from denying support for his stepchild.' 7 7 The
supreme court also stated that the natural father must demonstrate
that he is financially unable to support his children before the stepfather will be ordered to do so.'

78

Furthermore, the Miller majority

went so far as to say that a stepfather who is ordered to pay child
support may have a reimbursement claim against the natural father
for any such expenses actually incurred. 7 9 These "guidelines" will
only foster litigation and delay a final support decision. The Miller
opinion encourages continuing support battles between stepparents
and natural parents by holding that "changed circumstances" can
80
alter or modify the stepparent's support duties.'
These vagaries in the Miller decision probably reflect the prevailing view of society-that the natural parent is primarily responsible for the support of his child.' 8 ' By attempting to follow this view
and still provide for the best interest of the child, the Miller court
afforded trial courts broad discretion and encouraged ad hoc review
of matters similar to Miller.' s2 It is regrettable, however, that Miller's
the unavailability of the natural parent as the prerequisites to application of the
equitable estoppel doctrine. See id. at 583-84, 498 A.2d at 784 (Pollock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Furthermore, Justice Handler believed that the M.H.B. facts warranted a conclusive finding of equitable estoppel because of the stepchild's detrimental reliance
on the stepparent. Id. at 573, 577, 498 A.2d at 778, 780 (Handler, J., concurring).
Justice Pollock, however, stated that he "would remand the matter to the Chancery
Division for reconsideration" of the natural parent's ability to support his child. Id.
at 584, 498 A.2d at 784 (Pollock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thus, the nature of the court's decision in M.H.B. demonstrates the difficulty that
trial courts will have in applying the principles enunciated in Miller. See infra notes
176-180 and accompanying text.
176 See Ahller, 97 N.J. at 167-70, 478 A.2d at 358-59.
177 See id. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359. The Miller majority stated: "We emphasize,
however, that the natural parent should always be considered the primary recourse
for child support because society and its current laws assume that the natural parent will support his or her child." Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 170, 478 A.2d at 359; see also Note, supra note 138, at 587 (setting forth
precautions stepparent might take to preserve reimbursement claim against natural
parent).
180 Miller, 97 N.J. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359.
181 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
182 See Miller, 97 N.J. at 169, 478 A.2d at 358-59. The Miller court observed: "Matrimonial cases are extremely fact-sensitive because each case involves a unique set
of interpersonal relationships. The burden of establishing economic detriment depends on the facts of the particularcase." Id. (emphasis added).
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lack of clear guidelines concerning a stepparent's support obligations may act to limit the precedential value of the decision.
In an apparent effort to assuage the stepparent who does not
actively interfere in the natural father's relationship with his child,
the Miller court restrained its holding to those cases in which an arduous equitable estoppel test is proven.'
Although this approach
is commendable, the proposed test is ambiguous because the majority fails to articulate exactly what is needed to prove an equitable
estoppel." s4 The Miller decision leaves trial courts with scant guidelines to assist them in determining whether a case's facts support a
finding of representation, reliance, and detriment.1 8 5 Once again,
the uncertainties present in the Miller opinion act to diminish its
value as a standard for determining stepparent support liability.
Although the Miller decision failed to define conclusively the elements of equitable estoppel, the supreme court did settle some potential disputes. By relaxing the requirement that the stepchild
believe the stepparent is his natural parent, the Miller decision extended relief to all children and not just to those who were infants
when their parents and stepparents married. 8 6 The supreme court
appropriately acknowledged that the interests of all stepchildren
must be served. The majority also correctly determined that the
"emotional bonding" between stepparent and child will not induce
reliance sufficient to uphold an award for support.'8 7 The court
pointed out that loving step relationships might easily be discouraged if stepparents feared permanent support obligations. 18 8 Perhaps Justice Handler developed the most practical application for
"emotional bonding" by designating parental love as a "factor to be
183 The Miller court only permitted the equitable estoppel test to be used if the
stepparent "actively interfered" with the natural parent's support obligations. Id.
at 169, 478 A.2d at 359. The decision, however, does not define "active interference," and thus creates uncertain precedent for trial courts. See id. Stepparent interference will not always be as obvious as Jay Miller's destruction of Ralph Febre's

support checks. See id. at 160, 478 A.2d at 354.

See id. at 167-69, 478 A.2d at 358-59.
See id. The Miller majority held that some representation of support must be
made by the stepparent, but it did not state what form this representation might
take. See id. at 167-68, 478 A.2d at 358. In addition, the Miller court failed to articulate what factors might induce reliance by the stepchildren on the stepparent's sup184

185

port. See id. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358. Instead, the court discussed a factor that will
not induce sufficient reliance-" emotional bonding." See id. Furthermore, the

Miller court left any determination of future financial detriment solely to the discretion of the trial courts, Id. at 168-69, 478 A.2d at 358-59.
186 See id. at 167-68, 478 A.2d at 358.
187

Id. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358.

188 Id.
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weighed in making the equitable assessment." ' 89
The fact that stepchildren have traditionally been ignored
under most child support laws is regrettable, and the Miller court
has made a noteworthy effort to reverse this historic injustice. In
applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to this area of domestic
relations law, the Miller decision evidences a growing judicial concern for the rights of stepchildren. The Miller court properly recognized that the support needs of a child continue after his stepparent
and natural parent divorce. Unfortunately, in applying the theory of
equitable estoppel to the issue of stepparent support, the Miller majority does not afford the doctrine its fullest and most favorable application. By emphasizing the detriment to stepchildren as a
consideration when applying equitable estoppel,' 90 the court refused to make a clean break from the outdated and oppressive common law notions of stepparent support liability. A befitting
disclaimer of these common law principles would include an imposition of support liability on any stepfather who alienates a child from
his natural father while assuming the support of the child himself.
The fact that the number of American stepfamilies is increasing
every year' 9 ' makes the need for stepparent support liability even
more urgent. By giving the doctrine of equitable estoppel its
broadest possible application, modem courts will ensure that
stepchildren are amply taken care of and that their best interests are
appropriately served.
Karlene K. Knaub
189 Id. at 175, 478 A.2d at 362 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
19o Id. at 168, 170, 478 A.2d at 358, 359.
191 See Mahoney, supra note 48, at 38 (citation omitted); Bartlett, supra note 48, at
912 (citations omitted).

